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Introduction: Moral
Development Study in
the 21st Century
Carolyn Pope Edwards
and Gustavo Carlo
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Questions of right and wrong, good and bad, lawful and unlawful, have been debated by philosophers, theologians, scholars, and
ordinary people since ancient times. The moral domain represents
humanity's answers to three questions: What is the right thing to do?
How is the best state of affairs achieved? What qualities make for a
good person? However, the scientific investigation of the moral life
has a much shorter intellectual history than does philosophical and
religious reflection; nevertheless, it is not new. Moral development
theory and research emerged as a critical topic over 100 years ago, at
the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, given this deep background,
it may surprise readers to learn that this is the very first time that
the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation has served as a forum to
reflect on what we know about moral development and motivation
and to integrate theory and research with practical implications for
schools, communities, and childrearing. This book presents the products of the 51st Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: "Moral Development through the Life Span: Theory, Research, and Applications."
The symposium was held in Lincoln, Nebraska, in April 2003.
Interest in moral development and motivation has been prominent in the field of psychology since Sigmund Freud's theory about
the Oedipus complex and the formation of the superego. Indeed, dur-
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ing certain earlier decades, especially the 1970s and 1980s, moral development was a hot and contentious topic among social and
behavioral scientists. Various proponents of behavioral versus structural theories, such as Lawrence Kohlberg and Jacob Gewirtz, enjoyed squaring off in public and professional debates. Some important books, such as Lickona (1976), Kurtines and Gewirtz (1984), and
Eisenberg, Reykowski, and Staub (1989), grew out of those debates,
and, even today, these sources are useful for reading clear statements
of the alternative theoretical perspectives, which are presented as
competing approaches to the study and interpretation of moral development. However, following that lively but contentious period,
the 1990s represented a quieter time of solid and steady gains in
research study of moral development and prosodal behavior as well
as a period of serious attempts at theoretical reconciliation and bridge
building.
This volume presents some of the most significant fruits of that
labor by distinguished and well-known researchers in the field. It is
intended to summarize what we now know about moral motivation
theory, research, and application across the life span. Although not all
major theoretical or empirical traditions are covered here, the authors
represent diverse theoretical orientations and methodologies that address many of the important issues in moral motivation. Various
themes run throughout the chapters, and each chapter summarizes
work that adds to our existing knowledge regarding moral development.

The Historical Background to Current Research
To understand our existing scientific knowledge of moral motivation, it is necessary first to consider some aspects of the historical,
cultural, and contextual underpinnings of the major research going
on in this field today. There is now a long and storied tradition of
scholarly advances in the study of moral development. The first large
systematic study of children's cheating, lying, obedience, and other
"good" behavior was conducted by Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth (1930). James Mark Baldwin (1897), a developmental psychologist, and John Dewey (1930), a philosopher and educator, were two
other Americans who did important foundational writing about the
ways in which moral thinking unfolds in childhood, but they did not

xi
In trod uction
test or document their theories with empirical research. Jean Pia get
in Geneva, Switzerland, drew partly on the work of Baldwin when

he invented new and productive ways to observe and interview children and then construct a framework with which to understand children's conceptions of games, rules, punishment, and justice and fairness (Piaget, 1932/1977).
Schooled in these early theoretical speculations and bodies of
findings as well as in the sociological theories of George Herbert
Mead (1967) and Emile Durkheim (1979), Lawrence Kohlberg initiated the contemporary era of systematic empirical research when, in
the 1960s, he formulated his "cognitive-developmental" stage theory of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Kohlberg, Levine, &
Hewer, 1983) in the form of strong claims and invited the field to engage in dialogue on the basis of argument and empirical evidence. At
Harvard University, Kohlberg worked with a series of colleagues and
students who went on to refine, elaborate, or critique and revise his
theory in major ways, extending its reach into such areas as domain
theory and social conventions (Turiel, 1983), social perspective taking
(Selman, 1980), ego development (Kegan, 1982), distributive justice
concepts (Damon, 1977), sociomoral reflection (Gibbs, Basinger, &
Fuller, 1992), women's "way of knowing" (Belenky, 1986; Gilligan,
1982), and cross-cultural studies (Edwards, 1979, 1985; Snarey, 1985).
Methodological issues (measurement, reliability, validity) were central, and Ann Colby and Kohlberg (1987) published a manual to aid
systematic methods of coding and scoring moral judgment interviews. James Rest at the University of Minnesota established a center
devoted to research on moral development using a paper-and-pencil
questionnaire based on Kohlberg's theory of moral development (the
Defining Issues Test; Rest, 1979; for more discussion, see Narvaez,
in this volume). Kohlberg was always deeply committed to making
positive changes in human life and society and, with such colleagues
as Clark Power and Ann Higgins (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989),
innovated methods of stimulating the development of moral reasoning and attitudes in school and prison settings.
Meanwhile, the theory aroused passionate debate and criticism
(e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Kurtines & Grief, 1974). Not only were more behaviorally oriented psychologists eager to establish alternative methods for systematically studying prosocial values and behavior (see,
e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1989; Staub, 1978), but also educators moved
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quickly to establish alternative ways of promoting "character education" in schools as a way of fostering the development and practicing of attitudes and behaviors creating respect for others, caring
attitudes, empathy, and appropriate cooperation with authority (see
also Noddings, 1984). Many of these programs have thrived and become influential models (e.g., Battistisch, Watson, Solomon, Schaps,
& Solomon, 1991). Thus, the controversies stimulated a rising and
vital field of study and helped set the agenda (pro and con) for much
of the ensuing research and practice regarding moral development
and education.
Since Kohlberg's death in 1987, moreover, the field of moral development and education has continued to evolve and change. Its
theoretical foundations have undergone important transformations,
perhaps as the almost inevitable consequence of over 4 decades of accumulating empirical study as well as the sustained, extensive scholarly debate. In this volume, we present the views of six noted scholars concerning the most important recent findings. Our contributors
synthesize work that has had, or is expected to have, a significant
impact on moral development theory, research, and application.
The varied research traditions in moral development and motivation are linked to crucial differences in underlying meta theoretical
assumptions. These philosophical and scientific assumptions are inherent to their perspectives, and they affect how each scholar both
interprets observed moral phenomena and selects his or her research
methods. In simplified terms, the issues can be considered by addressing a series of critical questions. (1) What motivates moral thinking and behavior? While emotions, intellect, and values may all be
part of the story, what is most important for the researcher to study
and describe? (2) Are objective standards or validating criteria (such
as religious commandants or approval by society) necessary to judge
and justify a person's actions? Or, instead, are matters of right and
wrong (good and bad) dependent on human beings' subjective choices,
which cannot be externally validated? (3) Are any moral rules or
principles universal to all times and places, in the sense that they
ought to be recognized by all human societies, or are moral issues
necessarily specific and relative to cultural and historical contexts
and circumstances? (4) What is the nature of human beings who make
choices and engage in moral or immoral actions? Are they active and
autonomous moral agents or, instead, passive persons whose behav-
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ior is (fully) explained by processes of socialization/social influence
or by unconscious emotions beyond individual control? (5) What is
the place of spirituality or faith in moral development as well as in
research? Can nonrational processes like the spiritual dimension of
moral decisionmaking be investigated by moral researchers? Does
spiritual development have a legitimate place in public school or community service programs that seek to promote moral development?
(6) What scientific methodologies should be employed and what kinds
of evidence brought forward to study moral motivation and development? Should affective or cognitive processes be the focus of attention?
What kind of evidence about actions, or observed behaviors, is required
to substantiate a research program? (7) Finally, what is the relation
between moral development research and childrearing and education?
That is, what can (and should) be fostered through processes of socialization or programs of therapy, reconciliation, and education? Are
such efforts primarily intended to foster changes in people's ideas
and expertise in rational decisionmaking, or, instead, are they directed
toward creating changes in people's emotions, feeling capacities, and

sphere of concern?
Because the philosophical, scientific, and educational issues that
lie behind and drive each scholar's program of research make for
interesting contrasts, we provide a preview of the volume and its
dominant themes by considering what the authors have to say about
each of these key questions. Readers will, we believe, find that the
chapters provide stimulating and provocative reflections on some
of the most important and timely issues of our day. The authors
represent some of the sophisticated and up-to-date theories, research,
and applications in knowledge about moral development across the
life span.

What Motivates Morality?
Moral behavior is intentional behavior, but what motivates it? Kagan
describes two essential motives as the foundation of moral behavior:
first, an emotional motivation to gain sensory pleasure (and avoid
pain); second, a cognitive motivation to confirm that one's behaviors,
thoughts, or feelings are in accord with one's concepts or representations of what is good. Eisenberg f~)Cuses on the influence of empathyrelated responding in motivating behavior. Although the primary
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focus of her research in graduate school was moral reasoning, over
time she became convinced that affective responses (empathy, sympathy, and personal distress) are as important as or more important
than rationality (moral reasoning) in predicting both pro social and
antisocial behavior. Power and Narvaez seem to agree that moral
motivation is an explicit yearning or desire to be good (virtuous, righteous) and to do good for self and others. Narvaez describes four processes fundamental to a moral orientation: moral sensitivity; judgment; motivation; and action. Power's model delineates cognitive,
environmental, and spiritual conditions or experiences that push individuals to seek the good. Hart, a personality theorist, is interested
in moral identity as a source of motivation. Identity is composed of
experiences related to self-awareness, continuity through time and
place, the self in relation to others, and the self as the basis for strong
evaluations. It includes the important plans, goals, and values that
form a basis for the individual's perceiving, judging, and acting. Hart
acknowledges that personality attributes influence moral responses
but reminds us of the social forces (community conditions) that can
facilitate or mitigate those behaviors.
Finally, Staub provides the most elaborated discussion of moral
motivations. He emphasizes a core set of basic human needs, such
as needs for nurturance, affection, and guidance in childhood. Emotional deprivation and difficult and challenging environments usually frustrate the individual and lead to negative emotions, such as
anger, envy, hostility, and aggression. Staub lays out a typology of
moral motivations: (1) beliefs or principles, such as enlightened selfinterest, the golden rule, or the sanctity of life; (2) altruism, which
arises out of empathy, sympathy, compassion, and, occasionally, suffering; and (3) pro social value orientation, which refers to a positive
view of humans and a sense of responsibility for others' welfare.
"Inclusive caring" (as opposed to in-group caring), moral courage,
and positive bystandership are forms of moral motivation especially
important to Staub.

Is Morality Objective or Subjective?
All researchers on moral development make some assumptions regarding the objectivity versus subjectivity of basic moral principles.
Certainly, ethicists have debated questions about the truth basis of
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morality and ethical decisionmaking for thousands of years without
coming to a consensus. Scientists, too, make different judgments,
having responded in contrasting ways to the complex issues involved. On the one hand, as moral researchers, they participate in
the Western community of science, which inherits an ancient intellectuallegacy of notions about truth seeking that is rooted in Greek
philosophy, for instance, Platonic notions about moral "ideals" that
can be and should be rediscovered by the rational mind. The Platonic
tradition has endured in the influential works of philosophers such
as Immanuel Kant (1785/1993) and, more recently, John Rawls (1971,
2001). Along that same line, most moral researchers are descendants
of cultural-religious traditions that affirm some objective and universal basis to certain moral principles, all the major world religions
(Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism) recognizing basic ethical
laws or moral commandments.
On the other hand, contemporary moral researchers undergo
training that immerses them in psychological concepts of consciousness and the self. They are exposed to developmental theories concerning childhood socialization and enculturation along with socialpsychological theories about interpersonal influence that heighten
recognition of the conscious and unconscious sources of individual
decisionmaking and the influence of context. Along this same line,
moral researchers as social scientists learn to appreciate the difficulty
of choosing one single" correct" overarching theory that explains all
aspects of human development, and they are trained in descriptive
and predictive statistical analytic techniques based on probabilistic determinism. All these influences incline researchers to question
whether moral decisionmaking can be truly objective.
Perhaps as a result of their scientific training, many moral developmental psychologists currently take the view that moral phenomena are interpreted and processed in unique ways by each individual,
as stated by Narvaez in her chapter. For example, both Kagan and
Staub devote major portions of their chapters to summarizing what
they see as the most important and general cognitive mechanisms
and developmental processes that can help account for the incredibly
wide range of human moral choices and phenomena. Kagan suggests that there is a "good" to which human beings aspire, and he
identifies a developmental cascade of processes that help account for
individual and group differences in moral actions, yet he explicitly
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rejects an objective basis to morality. At the Nebraska symposium, he
sparked lively debate when he declared that there is no objective way
to call immoral even the acts of people (e.g., terrorists) who destroy
others in the service of moral ideals. While Staub also focuses on
the life-cycle events that tend to promote the development of moral
conscience and prosocial behavior, he differs from Kagan in believing
that underlying the diversity of human judgments about morality is
the basic perception that moral action is about not doing harm or
injury to the self or others. Therefore, Staub comes closer than does
Kagan to affirming an objective notion of morality.
Eisenberg emphasizes subjectivism when she describes how processes such as empathy-related responding, affectivity, and affect
regulation powerfully motivate prosodal and discourage antisocial
actions. She defines prosocial behavior as voluntary behavior intended
to benefit another person and altruistic behavior as prosodal behavior
primarily motivated by other-oriented, moral values and emotions
rather than egoistic or pragmatic concerns. In other words, she asserts that pro social behaviors might have many different motives
but that altruistic behaviors have a much more specific underlying
motive.
Hart takes a pragmatic approach and focuses on the intrapersonal and environmental influences of moral character development.
Hart applies the notion of moral luck, which refers to the positive
opportunities available in certain kinds of environments, to his conception of morality. He suggests that moral behaviors are contingent
on social circumstances and opportunities as much as on personal
qualities. Thus, the moral qualities of individuals can be fostered or
hampered by experiences and opportunities in their environment.
In contrast to the others, Power takes the position closest to objectivism by holding to the central Kohlbergian insight that a sense of
justice as fairness does, and should, underlie mature and principled
moral reasoning. Narvaez, also a cognitive-develop mentalist in the
James Rest tradition, has moved away from Kohlbergian notions of
principled moral reasoning to the extent of viewing mature moral
reasoning as the product of "expertise." The objectivist orientations
that are reflected in Staub's, Power's, and Narvaez's perspectives
provide some contrast to the subjectivist orientations that are reflected in Eisenberg's, Hart's, and Kagan's perspectives.

xvii

Introduction

Are Moral Truths Universal?
The tension between objective and subjective moral ideals becomes
especially apparent when moral scholars debate the universal versus
relative nature of moral values and judgments (e.g., Wong, 1984). In
the present volume, most of the authors present paradigms that oppose extreme cultural relativism. Kagan is the exception. He argues
that cultures with integrity have promoted very different a priori
moral standards as moral ideals and that no one can be considered
altruistic or prosocial without specifying the agent, the target, and
the context of the action.
Leaving aside the issue of whether there are any cultural universals in the content of morality, all six contributors argue for some
universal elements of moral motivation or moral development. Kagan posits a universal developmental sequence for the separate components of morality: an initial concept of prohibited acts; an ability
to infer the thoughts of another; the acquisition of the value of the
semantic concepts good and bad; the ability to relate past to present;
and a recognition of social identity categories to which self belongs.
Likewise, Staub, Eisenberg, Narvaez, and Hart claim that there are
general cognitive mechanisms and emotional processes that underlie
moral development around the world.
Power goes farther and suggests that these universal formal processes imply a culturally universal basis to the content of the human
recognition of the good. For example, Power argues that desire for
good is tied closely to a desire for truth, justice, and happiness, and
he attempts to describe "the categorical, universal, and prescriptive
features of the moral domain" (p. 199). Furthermore, Power notes the
lack of focus by most researchers on the spiritual aspects of morality,
and he asserts that, at the highest stages of moral development, there
is transcendent understanding and appreciation of human existence.
It is important to note that the authors' perspectives on the generality of moral processes are not necessarily incompatible with other
evidence on the culturally specific aspects of moral decisionmaking
(Carlo, Koller, Eisenberg, Da Silva, & Frohlich, 1996; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Tietjen, 1986; Whiting & Edwards, 1988). For example, Eisenberg notes that her research suggests that cross-cultural
differences in prosocial traits (e.g., moral reasoning) exist. Narvaez
agrees but notes that the use of the Defining Issues Test reveals larger
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within-group than between-group differences, after controlling for
age and education. Staub (1989, 2003), who studies genocide and
works to promote reconciliation and healing, is especially interested
in societal-level forces and historical conditions that incline whole
groups of people to accept authoritarian regimes or commit mass
harm to others (see also Moshman, 2004).
One key to reconciling the different perspectives is to examine
the multiple sources of between- and within-group variance and consider both additive and interactive effects (Carlo, Roesch, Knight, &
Koller, 2001). Acknowledging the additive and multiplicative influences of moral outcomes would reflect the multidimensional, reallife complexity of individuals and enhance the ecological validity
of moral development theories. Furthermore, beyond simply documenting individual differences, it is critical to understand them.
Many or most aspects of normative moral thinking and behavior
grow out of specific cultural contexts for which they may be generally
adaptive (i.e., they allow people to function together in social settings,
manage and control aggression, and negotiate individual striving;
LeVine, 1994). For example, working in Kenya, Edwards (1979, 1985;
Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 1981) documented that differences in
the adult stage of moral reasoning among respected adults and elders (as measured by Kohlberg's structural system) were closely related to the context of daily living: whether conflict resolution was
situated within the close setting of a face-to-face community (rural
village) or, instead, within the impersonal institutions of a complex
society with competing elites. However, adaptation is not the whole
story of moral functioning. Any set of normative values or cognitive
schemata can quickly become maladaptive and reactionary in the face
of disequilibrating forces (overpopulation, famine, war, disease) or
rapid transformations of economy, education, and technology that
outpace individual and group capacities to adapt smoothly. Without
attention to the possible impact of historical and societal conditions,
there is a danger of overestimating the homogeneity of moral development in diverse social contexts.

Are Human Beings Active Moral Agents?
One of the common themes throughout the volume is the acknowledgment of individuals as active moral agents who have the capac-
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ity to control their actions. Whereas some prior theories of moral
conduct (e.g., radical behaviorist theories; Skinner, 1971) might have
posited the individual as a relatively passive agent, most contemporary theories of moral motivation seem to adopt an interactionist
perspective that acknowledges the individual as an active or autonomous agent. Interestingly, however, each theory may differ in
terms of the specific impact accorded the environment and the degree
to which individuals can modify or select their environment.
The chapters by Power and Narvaez provide examples of theories that emphasize the active role of the moral agent through cognitive and social information processes. Individuals are posited to
respond to moral situations on the basis of their own unique perceptions, which make their action choices dynamic and unpredictable.
Both Hart and Power acknowledge the role of the "moral self" as
an agent of morality-and, hence, self-concept development is an
integral part of moral development. Hart places the self inside the
community when he discusses "moral luck," or the socioeconomic
community into which the child is born and how poverty and other
adverse conditions can overwhelm a community's capacity to provide its young people with adequate opportunities for public service.
Eisenberg and Kagan offer a somewhat different but compatible conception of the active role of the moral agent via the individual's affective tendencies. According to them, affectivity and affective regulation processes influence both cognitive processes and moral action
choices. Two central issues in their scheme are the degree to which
individuals are aware of their influence and the degree to which those
processes are under individuals' willful control. In a different but not
necessarily incompatible perspective, Staub's chapter provides the
most elaborate account of the interaction between agent and environment.

What Is the Role of Spirituality in Moral Development?
Many theorists of moral development do not explicitly acknowledge
the role of spirituality, but Power addresses this topic in depth. Power
begins his chapter by referring to Kohlberg's (1973) proposed "stage
7" (existential stage). The idea of moral development beyond stage
6 was speculative (and, therefore, usually neglected in current textbook descriptions of Kohlberg's moral stage theory). In his paper on
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stage 7, Kohlberg hypothesized that the developing person may seek
a kind of cosmic insight or understanding that goes beyond the advanced and principled understanding of justice and welfare encoded
in the postconventional moral judgment stages. Although Kohlberg
was tentative in his hypotheses, Power has picked up on the invitation to speculate about cosmic or spiritual awareness as part of moral
development. Power believes that individuals who have attained a
sophisticated level of moral reasoning sometimes also thirst for a
mystical and personal understanding of the relation between their
moral self and the natural or supernatural universe. Their sense of
transcendence and spiritualism can be a source of moral inspiration
and motivation. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to
support this notion, but Power provides compelling anecdotal descriptions of how deep spiritual convictions and commitment interplay with moral understanding and lead to moral actions and
self-sacrifice (but see Colby & Damon, 1992; Oliner & Oliner, 1982).
Furthermore, Hart studies young people nominated as "care exemplars," and he discusses findings that suggest that most of the adolescents became involved in their moral commitments through social
institutions such as churches, service agencies, and schools. Clearly,
this is an area that deserves more attention from future researchers.

What Methods Should Be Used to Investigate
Moral Development?
It is evident from our discussion of the various meta theoretical as-

sumptions that the experts contributing to this volume have employed different methodological techniques in their research. However, arguments about methodology did not dominate the discussion
at the 51st Nebraska symposium. Perhaps this should not be surprising since debates that took place in the field 20 years ago about the
superiority of different research strategies (e.g., clinical interview format, paper-and-pencil questionnaires, experimental observations of
prosocial behavior, physiological measures of affective responding)
have given way in recent years to a general acknowledgment of the
potential benefits of using multiple methodologies. This transformation has yielded a rich pool of new information that promises to converge to provide a complex and differentiated conceptualization of
moral development. We are moving toward a more integrated under-
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standing that includes cognitive and emotional dimensions, micro
and macro levels of analysis, and proximal and distal causal factors.
Power and Narvaez, who emphasize cognitive-developmental
and information-processing approaches, use a combination of traditional and innovative methodologies to assess the cognitive components of moral development. Kagan, in contrast, is particularly
interested in temperamentally based reactions to unfamiliar events
and situations, and, therefore, he advocates longitudinal research on
the interaction of physiological predisp9sitions (reactivity) and emotional dispositions relevant to moral development (such as shame
and guilt). Eisenberg provides a synopsis of her multimethod approach, which relies heavily on physiological markers, self-report
and multiple-reporter measures, and observational techniques. In
her chapter, she argues for the importance of carefully distinguishing
different kinds of empathy-related responses and measuring them
separately. Each affect-defined as empathy, sympathy, and personal
distress-has different predictors and outcomes. For example, sympathy is associated with enhanced prosocial responding toward needy
or distressed individuals, whereas personal distress reactions sometimes are negatively related to helping and sharing. Similarly, Staub
relies on research findings from various methodologies but extends
his analysis by reflecting on case studies of individuals and societallevel events. In contrast, Hart uses a case study approach and also
borrows heavily from personality traditions in using large, archival
data sets to examine the personality by situation interactions that
predict moral functioning.

How Are Theory and Research Linked to Applications?
Questions regarding moral motivation become most significant
when we begin to develop programs aimed at promoting and fostering moral development. Each of the chapters offers insights into
the various sources of moral motivation and implications for childrearing or education. For example, Eisenberg's chapter indicates
the heuristic value of distinguishing between several categories of
empathy-related responses (empathy, sympathy, and personal distress) because each appears to be positioned differently along the
pathways linking socializing events and long-term prosocial outcomes. High levels of sympathy and empathy are linked to more
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positive outcomes, whereas high levels of personal distress (e.g., discomfort in the presence of someone needing help or comfort) tend
to predict more negative outcomes such as low levels of pro social
behavior (e.g., avoidance). Kagan's chapter likewise suggests the
vulnerability of highly anxious people to uncomfortable levels of
guilt and shame. Although not discussed at length in the present
volume, programs designed to foster empathic responding or to regulate emotional responding have been the focus or part of many
prevention and intervention programs (e.g., Battistisch et al., 1991).
The chapters by Power, Narvaez, Hart, and Staub go farthest in
elaborating links between theory, research, and application. Power
identifies three social contexts for promoting moral development:
schools; prisons; and sports. Based on Kohlberg's theory, the justcommunity approach provided a rich source of innovation in moral
education (Power et al., 1989). Power makes a persuasive argument
that, although the just-community program was originally designed
to foster moral judgment and reasoning through discussion and reflection, it actually affected behavior and motivation as well and involved changes in the moral atmosphere of the school, prison, or
community program toward becoming a democratic and respectful
community. Power's reflection on the impact of those pioneering
projects provides compelling evidence on the links between moral
cognitions, emotions, and behaviors.
In recent years, Power has turned his attention to implementing
moral development through sports activities and participation. Similarly, Hart and his colleagues have developed a program designed
to promote social responsibility and care through sports. The Sports
Teaching About Responsibility and Respect (STARR) program is an
exemplar of programs that can work under some of the most adverse
social circumstances, given the unique potential of sports to attract
and motivate young children and adolescents in situations where
other approaches to character education may fail. These researchbased, systematic ventures into changing moral character through
participation in team sports will undoubtedly become the subject of
much discussion and analyses by future moral developmental scholars.
Narvaez provides the most in-depth discussion of the application of moral education programs in schools. She summarizes in her
chapter various techniques that practitioners, teachers, and profes-
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sionals (and parents) can use to promote moral development in children. Based on a program developed for schools in Minnesota, Narvaez's approach is comprehensive and multidimensional and designed to address the four components of morality (Rest, Narvaez,
Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999).
Hart's chapter, as noted above, addresses how and why some
adolescents come to have relatively more moral elements in their
identity. Hart is interested in how identity comes to be invested in
moral lines of action through opportunities to join with others in the
activity or to be called to the activity by others. His work suggests
the importance of community service for developing adolescents.
Finally, Staub's chapter focuses on raising caring and nonviolent children but also includes reflections on significant societal-level
moral needs and challenges. Staub has long been interested in promoting active caring and helping, and he has helped create training
programs for teachers, police, and others to reduce violence, racism,
and the passivity of bystanders. He is also an expert on the roots of
collective violence and genocide (Staub, 1989) and has spearheaded
a project in Rwanda and worked with world leaders to promote healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation. His chapter finds echoes
throughout the volume when he describes what we know about
raising children to be "inclusively" caring, that is, children who care
about all human beings. The theme of moral courage-going beyond
the expected in the face of adversity-was important to all the contributors and participants at the 51st Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.
In conclusion, this volume represents a set of chapters equally
guided by respect for diverse theoretical perspectives, for experimental as well as observational and interview methodologies, and for
traditional as well as innovative approaches for studying the physiological, emotional, cognitive, and even spiritual sources of moral
motivation and behavior.
We hope that the integrations, analyses, and speculations offered
here will be provocative and that they will inspire a renewed interest in moral development theory and research as well as renewed
optimism about their potential to be implemented at individual and
collective levels of moral education.
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